Last month, at an event celebrating South Korea’s Liberation Day from Japanese forces at the end of World War II, the government expressed strong anti-Japanese sentiments. Kim Won-woong, the President of the Heritage of Korean Independence organisation, denounced “pro-Japanese traitors”, including South Korea’s first President, Syngman Rhee, whom he accused of “colluding with pro-Japanese to consolidate his post-liberation power”. The relations between Seoul and Tokyo have seriously deteriorated in recent years, owing to historical wartime labour issues, which has significantly hindered cooperation between the two countries.
Relations between Japan and South Korea rest on a bedrock of painful historical memories, impeding the growth of friendly relations. However, a rising and aggressive China and a volatile and belligerent North Korea have seriously shifted South Korea and Japan’s security consideration. Hence, amid a rapidly evolving security and strategic landscape in the region at large, the two countries are now being forced to consider whether to broaden their interaction and engagement for their mutual benefit and survival.
The historical issues resurfaced in 2018, when South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that Japanese companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd, Nippon Steel, and Sumitomo Metal Corp. must compensate South Koreans “for their forced labour” during World War II. In response, Japan stated that the court’s decision was “totally unacceptable”. According to Tokyo, the South Korean court ruling is a “violation of international law” because it counters the 1965 bilateral agreement signed between the countries, wherein Japan paid $300 million in grants and $200 million in low-interest loans to conclude that South Korea’s “claims were settled completely and finally.” However, South Korea’s Supreme Court ruled that agreements such as those signed in 1965 do not “impede individual victims’ rights to seek redress”. Therefore, if Japanese companies operating in South Korea do not pay the said compensation, the local courts can seize the company’s assets in the country; more than a dozen such cases are pending in South Korean courts and stand to impact about 70 Japanese companies.
At the time, Japan retaliated by removing South Korea from its “white list” of trusted trade partners and imposed strict regulations on Japanese exports to South Korea, particularly on crucial materials used in semiconductors, which are crucial to Seoul’s manufacturing industry. Fast-forward to 2020, and the issue continues to plague bilateral relations, as South Korea’s local court in Daegu initiated proceedings to liquidate Nippon Steel’s assets. In retaliation, Japan has imposed additional tariffs on South Korean products, stricter controls for issuing visas to South Koreans, and even recalled Japanese Ambassador Koji Tomita from Seoul. Some reports speculate that Japan may also approach the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Alongside the wartime labour, another unresolved thorny issue in bilateral ties remains use of Korean “comfort women” by Japanese soldiers during World War II. In 2015, erstwhile Korean President Park Geun-hye and her Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe appeared to have settled the matter and made a historic breakthrough, with the two leaders announcing a “final and irreversible” agreement, in which it was agreed that Japan would apologise and release funds worth $8.3 million for the victims. As per the agreement Abe phoned Geun-hye to offer the apology, following which the Japanese leader declared, “Japan and South Korea are now entering a new era. We should not drag this problem into the next generation.” However, many in South Korea did not accept the apology or the deal. Lack of public support in South Korea for the newly forged agreement resulted in its abandonment by incumbent President Moon Jae-in, with Seoul’s government even shutting down the fund following tensions in 2018.
Against this backdrop of retaliatory tariffs, the two countries have also reduced their security ties after South Korea decided to scrap its military intelligence-sharing pact with Japan in 2019, despite both countries facing the threat of Chinese expansionism. In such a scenario, the United States (US) has emerged as a key mediator and negotiator in order to safeguard the region’s security arrangements and strategic stability. For example, under US pressure, South Korea reversed its decision to terminate the General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA). The US is wary of the fact that a growing rift between its key regional partners, South Korea and Japan, provides space for China to expand its influence. This was witnessed in July 2019, when Seoul and Tokyo accused China and Russia of invading their respective airspaces above a small disputed island off the coasts of South Korea and Japan. South Korea retaliated by firing warning shots at the Russian and Chinese aircraft, but Tokyo protested that Seoul did not have the right to fire bullets and argued that it went against its territorial sovereignty. According to Nicholas Szechenyi, a researcher at Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the incident highlights a “missed opportunity to spotlight Chinese and Russian coercion in the region and the importance of deterrence in that context.”
Unlike Japan, South Korean policy has not actively balanced against China; rather, it has actively engaged with it. The difference in approach towards Beijing stems from Seoul’s and Tokyo’s differing threat perceptions. The stark contrast in policies towards China can be traced to the early period of the 2000s, when, although China was ramping up its military capabilities by commissioning new submarines and destroyers, South Korea perceived this build-up as targeting Japan and the US and not damaging to its own interests. Furthermore, South Korea considered China to be a partner in the North Korea issue. In this regard, in the 2003 Participatory Government Defense Policy paper, it highlighted China’s “crucial role as a concerned party and a mediator” in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea. Thus, at the time, South Korea was relatively optimistic that Beijing was ‘‘making every effort to calm the fears of neighboring countries” of an emerging Chinese threat.
However, by the later part of 2010, there was a change in South Korea’s perception. Jae Ho Chung argues that Seoul “increasingly sees China’s rise and Beijing’s assertiveness as an economic and security threat,” although, due to growing economic ties, it has “refrained from discussing the issue publicly, carefully practicing a policy of strategic ambiguity.” However, with growing US and China rivalry, and with the latter calling it the new “Cold War,” South Korea is increasingly having to consider picking a side.
Japan, on the other hand, has been navigating China’s rise by closely aligning itself with the US and even formulating novel partnerships such as the “Quad”, which is an informal strategic grouping of the US, Japan, India, and Australia that holds semiregular summits and joint military drills, and discusses regional economic and development assistance.
It is clear that there are certain economic sacrifices that the two countries will have to make in choosing a side and disengaging with China. For instance, South Korea was heavily impacted by the US’ decision to impose sanctions on Huawei, as the Chinese tech giant sources many of its chips from South Korean companies. However, these orders were cancelled following the sanctions, which negatively impacted Samsung’s semiconductor business. In fact, South Korea’s three major mobile carriers chose not to work with Huawei, which contributed greatly to South Korea’s shipments to China as a share of its total exports plummeting from 26% to 20% in 2019.
That being said, Seoul’s cautious approach to changing relations with China does not automatically imply better ties with Japan or erase the deep mistrust and historical baggage that have impeded both bilateral and multilateral engagement. Regardless of which side they choose in the US-China battle, tensions between Tokyo and Seoul have stood in the way meaningful coordination, as seen in the China-Japan-South Korea summits in 2012 and 2015, both of which were stalled due to tensions between the latter two.
There does, however, remain a ray of hope for improving ties. In August last year, Seoul’s local government planned to set up thousands of posters supporting the boycott of Japanese goods, but growing public criticism forced the government to take the signs down. Despite increasing anti-Japan sentiments in South Korea, the public criticism of the Seoul government’s move to embrace the boycott movement indicates that reconciliation of ties is possible.
This optimism has been somewhat dented amid recent developments with regards to wartime labour and “comfort women” becoming rallying points for politicians in Seoul. According to Daniel Roh, CEO of Seoul-based consultancy firm Asia Risk Monitor, wartime issues can only be resolved with a change in leadership in Tokyo and Seoul. Given that Abe is soon stepping down and is likely to pass to the torch to Yoshihide Suga, who has been dubbed as his right-hand man, there is a possibility for a reimagination of bilateral relations. However, this enthusiasm is tempered by the fact that Suga espouses the same hardline stance on historical issues. Therefore, a change in leadership in the current scenario is not likely to ease tensions.
Jennifer Lind, a political scientist, suggests turning the narrative of “victimhood and grievance toward one of empowerment and support” to bridge mistrust between the two nations. This is easier said than done, but the real-time security changes of the US-China rivalry and North Korea’s growing nuclear capability could push South Korea and Japan to expedite this process, whether they want to or not.
Could Chinese Expansionism Push South Korea and Japan Closer Together?
Relations between the two east Asian countries continue to remain tense over South Korea’s grievances with inadequate wartime reparations from Japan.
September 12, 2020
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, left, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in. SOURCE: NIKKEI PHOTO ILLUSTRATION/REUTERS AND GETTY IMAGES